Brokers voters clientelism

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Uiterlijk 11 december in huis

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections.



Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.

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Taal: en

Bindwijze: Paperback

Oorspronkelijke releasedatum: 16 september 2013

Aantal pagina's: 344

Illustraties: Nee

Hoofdauteur: Susan C. Stokes

Tweede Auteur: Thad Dunning

Co Auteur: Valeria Brusco

Hoofdredacteur: Peter Lange

Tweede Redacteur: Lange, Peter

Co Redacteur: Peter Hall

Hoofduitgeverij: Cambridge University Press

Extra groot lettertype: Nee

Product breedte: 152 mm

Product hoogte: 23 mm

Product lengte: 226 mm

Studieboek: Ja

Verpakking breedte: 152 mm

Verpakking hoogte: 228 mm

Verpakking lengte: 226 mm

Verpakkingsgewicht: 450 g

EAN: 9781107660397

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