Political economy of institutions and decisions public debt and the birth of the democratic state

Rubriek: Textual/Printed/Reference Materials - Boek

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This book develops new theory about the link between debt and democracy and applies it to a classic historical comparison: Great Britain in the eighteenth century which had strong representative institutions and sound public finance vs. ancient regime France, which had neither. The book argues that whether representative institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for government creditors to form new coalitions with other social groups, more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages. It then presents historical evidence to show that improved access to finance in Great Britain after 1688 had as much to do with the development of the Whig Party as with constitutional changes. In France, it is suggested that the balance of partisan forces made it unlikely that an early adoption of 'English-style' institutions would have improved credibility.

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Taal: en

Bindwijze: Hardcover

Oorspronkelijke releasedatum: 28 april 2003

Aantal pagina's: 224

Illustraties: Nee

Hoofdauteur: David Stasavage

Hoofduitgeverij: Cambridge University Press

Editie: New title

Extra groot lettertype: Nee

Product breedte: 152 mm

Product hoogte: 16 mm

Product lengte: 229 mm

Studieboek: Ja

Verpakking breedte: 152 mm

Verpakking hoogte: 16 mm

Verpakking lengte: 229 mm

Verpakkingsgewicht: 500 g

EAN: 9780521809672

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